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Protecting Intellectual Property and Privacy
in the Digital Age: The Use of National
Cybersecurity Strategies to
Mitigate Cyber Risk
Scott J. Shackelford*
INTRODUCTION
Days after one of the largest data breaches in U.S.
government history, in which the private information of more
than twenty-two million current and former federal government
employees was compromised,1 hackers claiming an affiliation
with Anonymous crashed several Canadian government
websites.2 Also in mid-2015, myriad firms including Blue Cross
Blue Shield were targeted,3 as was German Chancellor Angela
Merkel;4 even sports teams seem to be entering the fray with the
FBI probing the St. Louis Cardinals baseball team about
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* Assistant Professor of Business Law and Ethics, Indiana University; Edward
Teller National Fellow, Stanford University Hoover Institution; Senior Fellow, Center for
Applied Cybersecurity Research. An earlier version of this research was published as
Gauging a Global Cybersecurity Market Failure: The Use of National Cybersecurity
Strategies to Mitigate the Economic Impact of Cyber Attacks, in ECONOMICS OF NATIONAL
CYBER SECURITY STRATEGIES (NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence,
Pascal Brangetto ed., 2015). The author recently published an article discussing critical
infrastructure protection, cybercrime, and cybersecurity governance practices across
thirty-four nations. See Scott J. Shackelford & Andraz Kastelic, Toward a State-Centric
Cyber Peace?: Analyzing the Role of National Cybersecurity Strategies in Enhancing
Global Cybersecurity, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 895 (2015).
1 See, e.g., Ryan Evans, Why the Latest Government Hack is Worse than the
Snowden Affair, WASH. POST (June 17, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
hitting-an-agency-where-it-hurts/2015/06/17/ffca6c6a-1512-11e5-9ddce3353542100c_story.html [http://perma.cc/3NSF-3GA8] (“[T]he United States’ rivals and
enemies may have the leverage they need to induce or coerce government employees and
contractors into providing classified information.”); Mike Levine & Jack Date, 22 Million
Affected by OPM Hack, Officials Say, ABC NEWS (July 9, 2015, 3:17 PM), http://abc
news.go.com/US/exclusive-25-million-affected-opm-hack-sources/story?id=32332731
[http://perma.cc/ZXJ6-M738].
2 See Canada Government Websites Taken Down in Cyber Attack, GUARDIAN
(June 18, 2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/18/canada-governmentwebsites-taken-down-in-cyber-attack [http://perma.cc/5QE3-6DD5].
3 See Scott Dance, Cyberattack Affects 1.1 Million CareFirst Customers, BALT. SUN
(May 20, 2015, 10:03 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/health/bs-bz-carefirst-databreach-20150520-story.html [http://perma.cc/DCV7-6AUQ].
4 See Computer in Merkel’s Office Hit by Cyber Attack: Report, YAHOO! NEWS
(June 14, 2015, 4:16 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/computer-merkels-office-hit-cyberattackreport-034919582.html [http://perma.cc/Z4RJ-YRCJ].
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5 See Cardinals Sin: FBI Probes St. Louis Cardinals over Alleged Cyberattack, AL
JAZEERA (June 16, 2015, 1:37 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/6/16/fbireportedly-probes-cardinals-over-cyberattack.html [http://perma.cc/5XV3-3KWP].
6 See Robert Beeres & Myriame Bollen, An Economic Analysis of Cyber Attacks, in
CYBER WARFARE: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 147, 153 (Paul Ducheine et al. eds., 2012)
(discussing cybersecurity as a public good and, thus, we could define it as “the goods,
services, measures and techniques [that aim] to enhance the feeling of being secure in
cyberspace”).
7 See Helen Stacy, Professor, Stanford Univ., International Humanitarian Law
Issues, Remarks at the Meeting of the Committee on Policy Consequences and
Legal/Ethical Implications of Offensive Information Warfare (Apr. 11, 2007).
8 See NIST’s Voluntary Cybersecurity Framework May Be Regarded as de Facto
Mandatory, HOMELAND SECURITY NEWS WIRE (Mar. 3, 2014), http://www.homeland
securitynewswire.com/dr20140303-nist-s-voluntary-cybersecurity-framework-may-beregarded-as-de-facto-mandatory [http://perma.cc/39DQ-DN4W] (reporting on the extent to
which NIST Framework recommendations are becoming more mandatory).
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allegedly hacking into competitors’ databases.5 These events
highlight both the tumultuous nature and diverse array of
cyberthreats facing the public and private sectors around the
world. Some have gone so far to argue that we are facing a
market failure when it comes to effective, proactive cybersecurity
management in which costs are not being effectively internalized
to punish either bad actors or laggards.6 A similar argument
could be made looking at an array of national governments that
run the gambit in terms of their efforts to enhance national
cybersecurity. Are we then facing a global cybersecurity market
failure? And if so, what can realistically be done about it to better
protect intellectual property and civil rights and liberties in the
digital age?
These are questions admittedly far too large and complex to
comprehensively tackle in this Article, or indeed in a stand-alone
volume. However, it is possible to lay a foundation for analysis
that helps to break some new ground in the literature while
assessing cybersecurity best practices from the public and private
sectors that can cross-pollinate to help promote a global culture
of cybersecurity. In particular, this Article analyzes State
involvement in cybersecurity, including those policies aimed at
mitigating cyberthreats targeting intellectual property that fall
below the armed attack threshold—namely cybercrime and
espionage—by analyzing thirty-four national cybersecurity
strategies across the dimensions of economic espionage,
intellectual property theft, and civil rights and liberties.7
Although the focus is on national cybersecurity strategies,
related domestic follow-up initiatives are also considered,
including “voluntary” bottom-up initiatives being pursued by
leading cyber powers like the United States and Germany, such
as the U.S. National Institute for Standards and Technology
(“NIST”) Cybersecurity Framework.8 The vital role of the private
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sector to help identify and instill cybersecurity best practices is
also considered as part of a polycentric approach to fostering
cyber peace.9
I. ASSESSING THE CYBERTHREAT LANDSCAPE
Analyzing the cost of cyberattacks globally or to any one
particular nation is a difficult matter, made more so by the lack
of verifiable data and a common vocabulary. Consider the figure
often heard that more than $1 trillion has been lost to
cybercriminals, which has been attacked for, among other
reasons, the methodological problems associated with
extrapolating global trends from limited (and sometimes
unrepresentative) survey data.10 Indeed, calculating the costs of
attacks is also challenging for firms themselves, especially
because of questions over the impact of a data breach on brand
reputation, the price of downtime,11 legal liability, and costs
associated with a “competitor’s access to confidential or
proprietary information.”12 As a representative from TechAmerica,
an advocacy group for the U.S. technology industry, wrote in late
2010, such “calculations are incomplete estimates at best, and
sorely understated at worst.”13 Even as more jurisdictions move
toward a more robust disclosure regime, problems continue; for
example, even though the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission has required that firms disclose “material”
cyberattacks leading to financial losses since 2011,14 still a
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9 For more on this topic, see generally SCOTT J. SHACKELFORD, MANAGING CYBER
ATTACKS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, BUSINESS, AND RELATIONS: IN SEARCH OF CYBER PEACE
(2014).
10 Sheldon Whitehouse, U.S. Senator for R.I., Cyber Threats (July 27, 2010)
(transcript available at http://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/news/speeches/sheldon-speaksin-senate-on-cyber-threats [http://perma.cc/32CA-R8Z9]); see also Peter Maass & Megha
Rajagopalan, Does Cybercrime Really Cost $1 Trillion?, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 1, 2012, 11:12
AM), http://www.propublica.org/article/does-cybercrime-really-cost-1-trillion [http://perma.cc/
7BGN-QQSH] (critiquing McAfee and other estimates on which the $1 trillion figure was
based).
11 See, e.g., Katherine O’Callaghan et al., Managing Unplanned IT Outages, CIO
(Jan. 24, 2010, 10:00 PM), http://www.cio.co.nz/article/468694/managing_unplanned_it_
outages/ [http://perma.cc/4LEY-RNJ7].
12 Huseyin Cavusoglu, Economics of IT Security Management, in ECONOMICS OF
INFORMATION SECURITY 71, 74 (L. Jean Camp & Stephen Lewis eds., 2004).
13 TechAmerica, Comments on Cybersecurity, Innovation and the Internet Economy
3–4 (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.nist.gov/itl/upload/TechAmerica_Cybersecurity-NOIComments_9-20-10.pdf [http://perma.cc/UW8Z-BT3K].
14 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, DIV. OF CORP. FIN., CF DISCLOSURE GUIDANCE: TOPIC
NO. 2 CYBERSECURITY (Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/guidance/
cfguidance-topic2.htm [http://perma.cc/MM2Y-MTLZ]; see also Joel Bronstein, The
Balance Between Informing Investors and Protecting Companies: A Look at the Division of
Corporation Finance’s Recent Guidelines on Cybersecurity Disclosure Requirements, 13
N.C. J.L. & TECH. 257, 271 (2012) (citing TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S.
438, 449 (1976), which defined “material” as “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure
of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
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minority of publicly traded firms are offering data and even fewer
are volunteering that it has had a significant financial impact on
their operations.15 As a result, some have gone so far as to argue
that financial information about cybercrime reflects only
“approximate guesses.”16 That is a difficult starting point,
needless to say, for policymakers and managers alike.17 Yet, that
is the state of play at present. Thus, with those caveats, this Part
provides some background on the cyber threat facing the global
economy through the lens of three leading cyber powers—the
United States, Germany, and China.
A.

Global Losses to Cyberattacks
The true economic impact of cyberattacks is unknown, but
contested estimates range from $400 billion to more than
$2 trillion (which is a figure larger than estimates for the global
illegal drugs market),18 though in truth, no one really knows for
sure how big of a problem cyberattacks are for the reasons stated
above.19 For example, cyberattacks are often broken down into
four main categories: cyber terrorism, warfare, crime, and
espionage.20 But motivations can overlap and targets abound in
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significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available”).
15 See Chris Strohm, Eric Engleman & David Michaels, Cyberattacks Abound Yet
Companies Tell SEC Losses Are Few, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Apr. 3, 2013, 6:00 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-04-04/cyberattacks-abound-yet-companiestell-sec-losses-are-few [http://perma.cc/3D4E-GWJ8]; cf. Andrew Collins, SEC Increases
Scrutiny on Cyberattacks, SUSTAINABILITY ACCT. STANDARDS BOARD (July 14, 2014),
http://www.sasb.org/sec-increases-scrutiny-cyberattack-disclosures/ [http://perma.cc/859RBP98] (“[T]he SEC has opened investigations of multiple companies, focusing on data
security processes and disclosure on breaches (or lack of) to investors.”).
16 Robert Richardson, 2007 CSI Computer Crime and Security Survey, COMPUTER
SECURITY INST. 3, http://i.cmpnet.com/v2.gocsi.com/pdf/CSISurvey2007.pdf [http://perma.cc/
T55H-N5UE].
17 Ross Anderson et al., Measuring the Cost of Cybercrime, in THE ECONOMICS OF
INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY 265, 266 (Rainer Böhme ed., 2013), http://weis2012.
econinfosec.org/papers/Anderson_WEIS2012.pdf [http://perma.cc/45NS-92ZP].
18 See, e.g., CTR. STRATEGIC INT’L STUDIES, NET LOSSES: ESTIMATING THE GLOBAL
COST OF CYBERCRIME 2 (2014), http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-economicimpact-cybercrime2.pdf [http://perma.cc/4Z6H-G4G2] [hereinafter CSIS]; see also Brian
Taylor, Cyberattacks Fallout Could Cost the Global Economy $3 Trillion by 2020,
TECHREPUBLIC (Feb. 20, 2014, 10:38 AM), http://www.techrepublic.com/article/cyberattacksfallout-could-cost-the-global-economy-3-trillion-by-2020/ [http://perma.cc/4ULX-UWQD].
19 See, e.g., U.S. Cybercrime Losses Double, HOMELAND SECURITY NEWS WIRE (Mar. 16,
2010), http://homelandsecuritynewswire.com/us-cybercrime-losses-double [http://perma.cc/
F2UP-7J7M]; see also U.N. OFF. ON DRUGS & CRIME, WORLD DRUG REPORT 127 (2005),
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/WDR_2005/volume_1_web.pdf [http://perma.cc/H7XG-SYY3]
(estimating the “[s]ize of the global illicit drug market in 2003” at more than $320 billion);
Robert Vamosi, The Myth of That $1 Trillion Cybercrime Figure, SECURITY WK. (Aug. 3,
2012), http://www.securityweek.com/myth-1-trillion-cybercrime-figure [http://perma.cc/NC6RW2XM].
20 See, e.g., SCOTT CHARNEY, RETHINKING THE CYBER THREAT: A FRAMEWORK AND
PATH FORWARD 5 (2009), http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/en/details.aspx?displaylang=en
&FamilyID=062754cc-be0e-4bab-a181-077447f66877.
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cyberspace; how should one classify a state-sponsored
cyberattack involving a criminal organization to conduct
economic espionage, for example? Such ambiguity means that
some estimates count trade secrets losses as cybercrime, while
others as espionage, which is meaningful given the different legal
avenues to pursue under each scenario. In many ways, describing
a cyberattack, then, is in the eye of the beholder. Needless to say,
though, cyberattacks are a large and growing problem for
nations, firms, and ultimately, individuals around the world. The
G20 nations were estimated to have lost $200 billion to
cyberattacks in 2014 alone,21 though it is also telling that a
cohesive strategy has yet to emerge from this forum—comprising
some 85% of the global economy—to get a better handle on the
problem.22 The elite cyber powers, though, are not fairing much
better.
B.

Impact on the Leading Cyber Powers
There is not yet a consensus on the identity of the leading
global cyber powers. According to Booz Allen—a consultancy—for
example, the top three contenders are the United Kingdom,
United States, and Australia, in that order.23 China is ranked
thirteenth.24 However, in terms of a “cyber footprint,” the United
States, Germany, and China are, in some ways, in a league of
their own because of their leading technical industries and
vulnerability to cyberattacks—the United States and Germany
were the second and third most targeted nations as of June 19,
2015, according to the cybersecurity firm Kaspersky Labs.25
Thus, each of these nations will be briefly discussed in turn to
provide some context for discussion.
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21 See Pierluigi Paganini, McAfee Report on the Global Cost of Cybercrime, SECURITY
AFF. (June 10, 2014), http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/25635/cyber-crime/mcafee-reportglobal-cost-cybercrime.html [http://perma.cc/38MN-FUH9].
22 See id.
23 See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, BOOZ ALLEN HAMILTON, CYBER POWER
INDEX: FINDINGS AND METHODOLOGY 4 (2015), http://www.boozallen.com/media/file/
Cyber_Power_Index_Findings_and_Methodology.pdf [http://perma.cc/T82L-Y25P].
24 Id.
25 See Cyberthreat Real-Time Map, KASPERSKY LAB, http://cybermap.kaspersky.com/
(last visited Mar. 26, 2016).
26 See, e.g., Sharone Tobias, 2014: The Year in Cyberattacks, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 31,
2014, 12:28 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/2014-year-cyber-attacks-295876.
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1. The United States
The United States is frequently described as being the
nation with the greatest susceptibility to cyberattacks due to
both the high number of insufficient networks and the presence
of valuable—in some cases world-leading—trade secrets.26 The
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impact of these attacks on the U.S. economy is large, some say
enormous—more than 40 million U.S. citizens were victims of
cyberattacks in 2014 according to one McAfee survey.27 Likewise,
a report by the U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit estimates losses
from a major attack on U.S. critical infrastructure at roughly
$700 billion.28 Yet, despite the amount of current and potential
loss, the U.S. government has been relatively slow at developing
a comprehensive cybersecurity policy. In the face of congressional
inaction, President Obama issued an executive order that, among
other things, expanded public-private information sharing and
established the NIST Framework comprised partly of
private-sector best practices that companies could adopt to better
secure critical infrastructure.29 This Framework is important
since, even though its critics argue that it helps to solidify a
reactive stance to the nation’s cybersecurity challenges,30 it is
spurring the development of a standard of cybersecurity care in
the United States and beyond.31 Whether it is enough to help
protect the intellectual property of U.S. firms or the civil rights
and liberties of U.S. citizens, though, remains to be seen.
2. Germany
According to Booz Allen, Germany “is one of only five
countries (the others being the United Kingdom, the United
States, France, and Japan) to have a comprehensive national
cyber plan and a comprehensive cybersecurity plan” which is “a
key to its success.”32 The impact of cyberattacks on the German
economy has been severe, as it has for the United States and
China, with a total loss for all three nations coming in at $200
billion.33 Within Europe, Germany and the Netherlands
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See CSIS, supra note 18, at 3.
See JAYSON M. SPADE, CHINA’S CYBER POWER AND AMERICA’S NATIONAL SECURITY
26 (Jeffrey L. Caton ed., 2012) (citing EUGENE E. HABIGER, CYBERWARFARE AND
CYBERTERRORISM: THE NEED FOR A NEW U.S. STRATEGIC APPROACH 15–17 (2010)).
29 See NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS AND TECH., IMPROVING CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
CYBERSECURITY EXECUTIVE ORDER 13636: PRELIMINARY CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK 1
(2013), http://www.nist.gov/itl/upload/preliminary-cybersecurity-framework.pdf [http://per
ma.cc/QK8T-NY7U] [hereinafter NIST CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK].
30 Taylor Armerding, NIST’s Finalized Cybersecurity Framework Receives Mixed
Reviews, CSO (Jan. 31, 2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.csoonline.com/article/2134338/
security-leadership/nist-s-finalized-cybersecurity-framework-receives-mixed-reviews.html
[http://perma.cc/4MNM-V9E9].
31 See, e.g., Scott J. Shackelford et al., Toward a Global Cybersecurity Standard of
Care?: Exploring the Implications of the 2014 NIST Cybersecurity Framework on Shaping
Reasonable National and International Cybersecurity Practices, 50 TEX. INT’L L.J. 305,
310 (2015).
32 ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 23, at 3.
33 See Ellen Nakashima & Andrea Peterson, Report: Cybercrime and Espionage
Costs $445 Billion Annually, WASH. POST (June 9, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/report-cybercrime-and-espionage-costs-445-billion-annually/2014/
06/08/8995291c-ecce-11e3-9f5c-9075d5508f0a_story.html [http://perma.cc/5XC3-3LFP].
27
28
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particularly stand out for their losses to cybercriminals.34 In sum,
by some estimates Germany is losing approximately 1.6% of its
GDP to cyberattacks annually.35 Yet the German response to
such cyber insecurity has been impressive. In particular, the
federal government approved the German Cybersecurity
Strategy (Cyber-Sicherheitsstrategie für Deutschland) in
February 2011. The “[s]trategy recognizes cyberspace as an
essential domain for the German state, economy, and society, and
emphasizes the protection of critical infrastructure as a core
cybersecurity policy priority.”36 Germany has also been active in
identifying and spreading cybersecurity best practices in a
similar vein as the NIST Framework. The Federal Office for
Information Security (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik, or “BSI”) first released its IT Baseline
Protection (IT-Grundschutz) in 1994.37 This set of BSI standards
contains recommendations for cybersecurity and has been
adopted by German corporations and international stakeholders;
some of the standards are now available in English, Swedish, and
Estonian. In summary, Germany’s comprehensive approach to
cybersecurity policymaking stands in contrast to both the United
States and China and has earned top marks for being the most
robust cybersecurity legal environment in the world.38
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See CSIS, supra note 18, at 9.
See id.
36 Scott J. Shackelford, Scott Russell & Andreas Kuehn, Unpacking the International
Law on Cybersecurity Due Diligence: Lessons from the Private Sector (Chi. J. Int’l L.
Research Paper No. 15-64, 2015) (representing the first publication of portions of these
case studies); see also Cyber-Sicherheitsstrategie für Deutschland, FED. MINISTRY
INTERIOR (2015), http://www.bmi.bund.de/DE/Themen/IT-Netzpolitik/IT-Cybersicherheit/
Cybersicherheitsstrategie/cybersicherheitsstrategie_node.html [http://perma.cc/8AWDJME5].
37 See Carsten Schulz, BSI Offers Free IT Baseline Protection Manual, Solicits
Comments, IEEE COMPUTER SECURITY (1997), http://www.ieee-security.org/Cipher/
Newsbriefs/1997/971004.bsiITmanual.html [http://perma.cc/CJG4-R6EN].
38 See ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, supra note 23, at 5.
39 See Internet Users by Country (2014), INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internet
livestats.com/internet-users-by-country/ [http://perma.cc/8Q7WG-CVCL].
34
35
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3. China
Although much of the attention, especially in the Western
press, has been paid to Chinese cyberattackers targeting the
trade secrets of advanced firms, including those based in the
United States and Germany, China is also a leading victim of
cyberattacks; it is the second largest economy in the world with
the most Internet users of any nation on Earth—some 640
million as of June 2015—more than double the number of U.S.
citizens online.39 Yet, as with the United States, China’s
cybersecurity strategy remains fragmented, even as its
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development and implementation has recently garnered political
support of high-ranking senior government officials.40 Among the
actions taken in China’s current cybersecurity strategy are
enhanced critical infrastructure protections “addressing China’s
dependency on foreign technology as a security issue, the
promotion of Chinese cryptography standards, the build-up of
broadband infrastructure, next-generation mobile technology,
and e-government services.”41 Civil liberties and, until relatively
recently, intellectual property protection have not been priorities
for the Chinese government.42 Indeed, China’s official government
position remains that “[p]roperly guiding Internet opinion is a
major measure for protecting Internet information security.”43
Yet even with this broad scope of state-centric regulation, as
compared to the more bottom-up NIST Framework and BSI
Standards, China’s efforts have been criticized as lacking
effective enforcement or being otherwise misguided,44 which may
help explain China’s lower cyber power rating relative to the
United States or Germany.45
C.

Summary
Although the onus is on the cyber powers in many ways to be
norm entrepreneurs and enhance global cybersecurity, there is
no island in cyberspace. Nations around the world have a role to
play in combating this global collective action problem. Yet as we
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40 See China Must Evolve from a Large Internet Nation to a Powerful Internet
Nation, XINHUANET (Feb. 27, 2014, 8:43 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/201402/27/c_119538788.htm [http://perma.cc/4DZ8-TEYQ].
41 Shackelford, Russell & Kuehn, supra note 36, at 20; see also Hauke Johannes
Gierow, Cyber Security in China: New Political Leadership Focuses on Boosting National
Security, 20 MERCATOR INST. CHINA STUD.: CHINA MONITOR, Dec. 9, 2014, at 1, 2,
http://www.merics.org/fileadmin/templates/download/china-monitor/China_Monitor_No_2
0_eng.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z2LX-7V24]. China is far from alone in seeking to protect its
domestic industry in the name of enhancing cybersecurity. See Karen Kornbluh, Beyond
Borders: Fighting Data Protectionism, 34 DEMOCRACY J. (2014), http://democracyjournal.org/
magazine/34/beyond-borders-fighting-data-protectionism/?page=all [http://perma.cc/GW4959RD]; Scott J. Shackelford, How to Enhance Cybersecurity and Create American Jobs,
HUFFINGTON POST (July 16, 2012, 2:09 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/scott-jshackelford/how-to-enhance-cybersecurity_b_1673860.html [http://perma.cc/WUB3-C6E4].
42 See China to Further Strengthen Intellectual Property Rights Protection, CHINA
BRIEFING (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2013/03/26/china-to-furtherstrengthen-intellectual-property-rights-protection.html [http://perma.cc/G2F2-PLJE].
43 Chris Buckley & Lucy Hornby, China Defends Censorship After Google Threat,
REUTERS (Jan. 14, 2010, 9:02 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/01/14/us-chinausa-google-idUSTRE60C1TR20100114 [http://perma.cc/2G8E-7VUD].
44 See Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, The ‘Chilling Effect’ of China’s New Cybersecurity
Regime, FOREIGN POL’Y (July 10, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/10/china-newcybersecurity-law-internet-security/ [http://perma.cc/TJD7-3TZX].
45 For more background on the comparative regulation of critical infrastructure, see
generally Scott J. Shackelford & Amanda N. Craig, Beyond the New “Digital
Divide”: Analyzing the Evolving Role of National Governments in Internet Governance and
Enhancing Cybersecurity, 50 STAN. J. INT’L L. 119 (2014).
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will see in Part II, the extent to which developed and developing
nations alike are meeting this burden runs the gambit, opening
the door for other potentially more innovative stakeholders,
including the private sector.
II. THE BIRTH AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL
CYBERSECURITY STRATEGIES
Those, such as Judge Frank Easterbrook, who advocate “that
efficiency is the desired outcome” of the law and that the free
“market is the most desirable route to such efficiency,” believe
that regulation displaces competition and can even “defeat the
market altogether.”46 However, some regulatory room is left even
among free-market proponents to correct market imperfections.47
The question then is which, if any, of the cyber powers, or other
developed and developing nations, have gotten this cybersecurity
regulatory balance right? Although a global analysis of
cybersecurity regulation is beyond the scope of this Article, the
focus here is on national cybersecurity strategies as a guide for
better understanding the national strategic focus of these nations
to guide the development of twenty-first century cyberspace. In
all, thirty-four nations are investigated particularly as their
policies relate to the economic impact of cyberattacks—including
espionage mitigation and intellectual property protection—along
with associated privacy and civil liberties issues.48 First, though,
a few notes are offered on methodology, as well as on the birth
and evolution of national cybersecurity strategies, to provide a
framework for discussion.
A.
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46 ANDREW D. MURRAY, THE REGULATION OF CYBERSPACE: CONTROL IN THE ONLINE
ENVIRONMENT 165–66 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
47 Id. at 166. But see Jerry Brito & Tate Watkins, Loving the Cyber Bomb? The
Dangers of Threat Inflation in Cybersecurity Policy, 3 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 39, 82
(2011) (making the case against there being a cybersecurity market failure); Eli Dourado,
Is There a Cybersecurity Market Failure? (George Mason Univ. Mercatus Ctr., Working
Paper No. 12–05, 2012) (arguing that market failures are not so common in the
cybersecurity realm).
48 For more background on methodology and other related issues, such as
cybercrime, critical infrastructure protection, and governance, see Scott J. Shackelford
& Andraz Kastelic, Toward A State-Centric Cyber Peace?: Analyzing the Role of National
Cybersecurity Strategies in Enhancing Global Cybersecurity, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB.
POL’Y 895 (2015) (representing a comparative study of national cybersecurity strategies
focusing on critical infrastructure protection, cybercrime, and governance).
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A Note on Methodology
The affirmative choice was made to conduct this targeted
survey so as to analyze the thirty-four (“G34”) published national
cybersecurity strategies representing those nations with
cybersecurity strategies in place and available in English as of
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September 2014.49 These data were amassed from the European
Union and NATO; all of the information is publicly available.50
Documentation of key findings is included in Appendices A and
B. It should also be noted that the following study only analyzes
the instances in which certain key phrases were used in the
national cybersecurity strategies, such a “trade secrets.” More
nuanced and methodologically sophisticated work is needed to
unpack and compare these findings in greater detail.
B.
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49 It should be noted that three additional nations—Belgium, Luxembourg, and
Romania—also had strategies in place at this time, but they were not available in English
as of this writing. We used Google Translate to help identify some of the relevant
passages for other researchers, but kept those data out of our primary analysis to help
ensure consistency. The countries analyzed are: Armenia, Australia, Austria, Canada,
Colombia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, India, Italy,
Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria,
Norway, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
50 See National Cyber Security Strategies in the World, ENISA, http://www.enisa.
europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/national-cyber-security-strategies-ncsss/nationalcyber-security-strategies-in-the-world [http://perma.cc/2FGK-T7CG]; Strategies and Policies,
NATO CCDCOE, https://www.ccdcoe.org/strategies-policies.html [http://perma.cc/527MR94W].
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Birth and Evolution of National Cybersecurity Strategies
In general, it could be said that national cybersecurity
strategies stem from at least three needs. First, cybersecurity
requires flexible adaptations beyond traditional security theory
transposed to cyberspace. Volumes of unstructured data,
inhumanly short time scales, and difficulties in attribution,
among other challenges, mean that simplistic institutional
models based on one-sided liability schemes, the arbitrary
separation of public and private interests, or a focus solely on
malevolent actors as the source of risk, are likely to do more
harm than good due to adverse selection and moral hazard.
Second, a cybersecurity strategy is a political act; it creates
expectations and raises awareness among businesses and civil
society. However, when addressing cybersecurity, governments
need to answer the question of whether the competitive market
can effectively enhance cybersecurity without regulatory
interference, or whether policymakers must intervene to address
market failures. Cybersecurity is structured in layers with
incidents ranging from “people may die” to “people may lose trust
in e-commerce” that require adapted answers and the
involvement of many actors, thus rendering governance of
cybersecurity difficult, as shown by the ambiguity in many of the
cybersecurity strategies surveyed. Third, trust and “fair”
governance must be strengthened such as by promoting
impartiality, reflexivity, and proximity; cybersecurity may be
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seen as a factor impairing the openness of the Internet if
incentives are not aligned.
Despite the need for comprehensive, transparent, and robust
national cybersecurity strategies, they were relatively slow to get
going. For example, the United States in many ways pioneered
national cybersecurity, beginning with the creation of the first
Cyber Emergency Response Team (“CERT”) in 1988.51 However,
it was not the United States, but Russia that enacted among the
first of what could be considered national cybersecurity strategies
in 2000. Since then, though, the pace has picked up considerably
with 2013 being the busiest year studied to date.52 Still, while
many of these new strategies have a great deal in common, they
still diverge in myriad aspects including in the related areas of
economic espionage, intellectual property protection, and civil
rights, as is discussed next.
C.

Analysis of National Cybersecurity Strategies
This section briefly reviews the G34 national cybersecurity
strategies analyzed across the dimensions of economic espionage,
intellectual property protection, and civil rights, with the goal of
determining those areas in which practices may be converging,
giving rise to opportunities for norm development to help
promote cyber peace.
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51 See About Us, U.S. COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM, https://www.uscert.gov/about-us [http://perma.cc/Q96X-L3LL]; see also SHACKELFORD, supra note 9, at 3.
52 For more information on how this timeline breaks down, see Figure 5 in
Shackelford & Kastelic, supra note 48, at 926.
53 See, e.g., Robert Hackett, Diplomacy Is Failing to Protect the United States’ Trade
Secrets, FORTUNE (May 11, 2015, 1:51 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/05/11/diplomacy-isfailing-to-protect-the-united-states-trade-secrets/ [http://perma.cc/9JHF-M2DQ].
54 See infra Appendix A (these nations include: Armenia, Australia, Canada,
Estonia, Japan, Malaysia, New Zealand, Qatar, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the
United States).
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1. Economic Espionage and Intellectual Property Protection
Despite the attention paid to the dangers of economic
espionage and trade secrets theft, many nations pay little if any
attention to this aspect of the multifaceted cyberthreat in their
national cybersecurity strategies. Only Russia’s, for example,
explicitly uses the term “trade secret.” This is surprising given
both the importance of trade secrets, comprising much of the
value of many leading firms, as well as the substantial (and
well-publicized) risk of cyberattackers poaching this invaluable
and often hard-won intellectual property.53 However, eleven
nations (32%) did discuss the importance of intellectual property
protections more generally,54 while four nations (12%) referenced
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patents.55 All of the strategies at least mentioned the economic
impact of cyberattacks. As for the causes of intellectual property
theft, sixteen nations (47%) referenced the threat that espionage
poses to the well-being of their national economies (as compared
to 68% that discuss cybercrime perhaps owing to the sometimes
more opaque nature of espionage).56 Only four nations (12%)
explicitly used the phrase “economic espionage” in their national
cybersecurity strategies.57
Figure 1: Economic Espionage and Intellectual Property
Protection Dimension Summary Chart58

56
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See id. (these nations include: Australia, Italy, New Zealand, and Russia).
See id. (these nations include: Armenia, Australia, Austria, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Spain, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom, and the United States). For more information on how cybercrime is
treated across these strategies, see Shackelford & Kastelic, supra note 48, at 916–19.
57 See infra Appendix A (these nations include: Japan, Spain, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom).
58 See id.
59 See, e.g., Melissa Riofrio, It’s Privacy Versus Cybersecurity as CISPA Bill Arrives
in Senate, PCWORLD (Apr. 25, 2013, 3:00 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2036328/its-privacy-versus-cybersecurity-as-cispa-bill-arrives-in-senate.html [http://perma.cc/5YGA9E9Z].
55
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2. Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
The difficulty of managing cyberattacks is oftentimes
discussed as a balancing act between ensuring privacy and
promoting cybersecurity.59 That is one reason why cybersecurity
reform legislation has been so contentious in the U.S. Congress,
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such as with the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act
(“CISPA”), which aimed to boost information sharing to better
manage cyberattacks; however, concerns arose regarding the
type and quantity of personal information being shared.60 Part of
the difficulty arising in the U.S. context is that privacy itself is
such a multi-faceted concept, meaning different things to
different stakeholders. It encompasses (among much else)
freedom of thought, of bodily integrity, solitude, information
integrity, and the protection of reputation and personality.61
Countries around the world strike the balance between the
protection of individual privacy and security in varied ways that
flex as perceived national emergencies and social trends ebb and
flow.62 This is seen in the national cybersecurity strategies
surveyed. For example, twenty-two nations (65%) discussed
“privacy” in their national cybersecurity strategies.63 Such a high
percentage may owe to the fact that many nations agree in
principle that the individual’s right to privacy is a human right
recognized in international treaties, including the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the 1966 International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights,64 and a 2013 U.N. General Assembly
Resolution that unanimously backed a “right to privacy in the
digital age” in the aftermath of former NSA contractor Edward
Snowden’s revelations.65 Other areas of agreement between the
strategies include seventeen countries (47%) referencing “civil
rights,”66 while seven nations (21%) discuss “civil liberties”
broadly.67 This may be because “civil rights” create “legal actions
See id.
See generally Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087
(2002) (advocating a pragmatic approach to conceptualizing privacy).
62 See Emanuel Gross, The Struggle of a Democracy Against Terrorism—Protection of
Human Rights: The Right to Privacy Versus the National Interest—The Proper Balance,
37 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 27, 28–30 (2004) (recognizing that national tragedies can cause
legal responses that limit privacy in extreme and irrational ways).
63 See infra Appendix B (these nations include: Armenia, Australia, Austria, Canada,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Macedonia, Netherlands,
Nigeria, Norway, Qatar, Russia, Slovakia, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, and the United States).
64 G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, at art. 12 (Dec. 10,
1948) (“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home
or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.”); see also G.A. Res.
2200 (XXI) A, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., U.N. Doc. A/6456, at art. 17 (Dec. 16, 1966) (reiterating text from Universal
Declaration of Human Rights).
65 General Assembly Backs Right to Privacy in Digital Age, U.N. NEWS CTR. (Dec. 19,
2013), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=46780&Cr=privacy&Cr1=#.UtKxr
PYjBkU [http://perma.cc/P3CU-JFBH].
66 See infra Appendix B (these nations include: Australia, Austria, Estonia, Czech
Republic, Germany, Italy, Macedonia, Netherlands, Poland, Russia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States).
67 See id. (these nations include: Armenia, Australia, Hungary, Italy, Romania, the
United Kingdom, and the United States).
60
61
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that the government takes to create equal conditions for all
people,” whereas “civil liberties” refer “to protections against
government actions,” a perhaps more thorny topic that more
nations seem unwilling or unable to tackle in their national
cybersecurity strategies.68 Relatedly, 56% of the G34 discuss
information sharing as an integral strategy for managing
cyberattacks generally, though not necessarily within the context
of civil rights.69
Figure 2: Civil Rights and Civil Liberties
Dimension Summary Chart70
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68 Civil Rights vs. Civil Liberties, STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES (Oct. 18, 2013),
https://journals.law.stanford.edu/stanford-journal-civil-rights-and-civil-liberties-sjcrcl/online/
civil-rights-vs-civil-liberties [http://perma.cc/UU7H-W79G].
69 For more information on how information sharing is treated across these strategies,
see Shackelford & Kastelic, supra note 48, at 913.
70 See infra Appendix B.
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Summary
There is a growing consensus that nations bear increasing
responsibility for enhancing cybersecurity. Although a growing
number of countries seem to be recognizing this fact by enacting
national cybersecurity strategies, many are written as broad
vision statements rather than comprehensive and concrete
frameworks for enhancing national cybersecurity. More nations
should emulate norm entrepreneurs such as Saudi Arabia, which
has a detailed report of more than 100 pages in length, laying out
its cybersecurity posture in great detail. Still, broad vision
statements, while important, should be considered as merely one
aspect of a global campaign to correct market failures
surrounding cybersecurity. Hence, it is vital to focus not only on
nations but also on other stakeholders, including the private
sector, as part of a polycentric strategy to manage cyberattacks.
In that perspective, businesses play a vital role in promoting
cyber peace, such as by identifying and spreading cybersecurity
best practices.

37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 60 Side A
Do Not Delete

05/09/2016 12:16:02
4/23/16 9:50 AM

2016] Protecting Intellectual Property & Privacy in the Digital Age

459

III. THE IMPORTANCE OF PRIVATE-SECTOR PARTNERSHIPS IN
ENHANCING GLOBAL CYBERSECURITY
Space constraints prohibit a thorough rendering of the
importance of active private-sector engagement to help create a
global culture of cybersecurity.71 However, two areas are briefly
considered to help enrich the discussion. First is the necessity of
investing in proactive cybersecurity best practices rather than
relying on a reactive stance. Second is the NIST Framework,
which is examined as an arguably successful mechanism for
fostering public-private cooperation to enhance national
cybersecurity.
A.

72
73
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For more on this topic, see SHACKELFORD, supra note 9, at 3.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012).
See, e.g., Hackback? Claptrap!—An Active Defense Continuum for the Private
Sector, RSA CONF. (Feb. 27, 2014), http://www.rsaconference.com/events/us14/agenda/
sessions/1146/hackback-claptrap-an-active-defense-continuum-for [http://perma.cc/PM3SEF2Z] (“[A]ctive defense should be viewed as a diverse set of techniques along a spectrum
of varying risk and legality.”); see also Orla Cox, Proactive Cybersecurity – Taking Control
Away from Attackers, SYMANTEC CONNECT (Apr. 2, 2014), http://www.symantec.com/
connect/blogs/proactive-cybersecurity-taking-control-away-attackers [http://perma.cc/35TWR37E]; Michael A. Davis, 4 Steps for Proactive Cybersecurity, INFO. WK. (Jan. 18, 2013,
12:25 PM), http://www.informationweek.com/government/cybersecurity/4-steps-for-pro
active-cyber security/d/d-id/1108270 [http://perma.cc/G4L7-BLTF].
74 For more on this topic, see SCOTT DYNES, INFORMATION SECURITY INVESTMENT
CASE STUDY: THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR (2006), http://www.tuck.dartmouth.edu/cdsuploads/research-projects/pdf/InfoSecManufacturing.pdf [http://perma.cc/9QG5-SZ24].
75 For more background on the proactive cybersecurity movement, see Amanda N.
Craig, Scott J. Shackelford & Janine S. Hiller, Proactive Cybersecurity: A Comparative
Industry and Regulatory Analysis, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 721 (2015).
71
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Proactive Cybersecurity Best Practices
Proactive does not mean “hack back,” which runs afoul of a
wide array of national cybercrime laws including the U.S.
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.72 Instead, the proactive
cybersecurity movement includes technological best practices
ranging from real-time analytics to cybersecurity audits
promoting built-in resilience,73 and may be considered to be a
response to the more reactive stance of an array of companies.74
Market leaders such as Microsoft and Google have helped to
popularize such tactics as advanced threat intelligence sharing,
enabling security companies to reasonably predict access
attempts by malicious actors rather than guard against already
known malicious traffic. Such an approach represents an
opportunity for firms to create broad, collective defense
partnerships; however, with whom and how intelligence is
shared will impact both the success of those partnerships and
how private-sector security actors shape evolving polycentric
governance structures discussed in Part IV.75 Likewise, many of
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these same companies are involved in the race for better
encryption to help safeguard their customers’ data from
unwanted intrusions in the wake of former NSA contractor
Edward Snowden’s leaks.76 This is pitting Silicon Valley against
the law enforcement community, fearing that in the name of
protecting civil rights, national security may be compromised.77
At the national level, industry collaboration is impacting the
ways in which cybersecurity is being conceptualized and
regulated, as was seen with the development of the NIST
Framework introduced above.78
B.

Case Study: NIST Framework
The difficulty of forming effective cybersecurity regulatory
interventions is high, as is the cost if things go wrong. Hence, in
part to avoid the regulatory confusion, more jurisdictions are
moving toward bottom-up approaches to mitigate cyber risk. One
such approach is the NIST Framework; first announced as an
executive order in February 2013, the Framework version 1.0,
Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,
was released in February 2014.79 The NIST Framework
harmonizes consensus standards and industry best practices to
provide, its proponents argue, a flexible and cost-effective
approach to enhancing cybersecurity that assists owners and
operators of critical infrastructure in assessing and managing
cyber risk.80 Yet the Framework also has its detractors. Some, for
example, have cautioned that the Framework does not go far
enough in terms of its scope, influence, or impact.81 One of the
main questions surrounding the NIST Framework is how
“voluntary” it will actually turn out to be—as well as how
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76 See, e.g., Alan Rusbridger & Ewen MacAskill, Edward Snowden Urges
Professionals to Encrypt Client Communications, GUARDIAN (July 17, 2014, 12:14 PM),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/17/edward-snowden-professionals-encryptclient-communications-nsa-spy [http://perma.cc/5HUZ-F6CS].
77 See Dina Temple-Raston, FBI Director Brings Silicon Valley Encryption Fight to
Capitol Hill, NPR (July 8, 2015, 6:34 PM), http://www.npr.org/2015/07/08/421225069/fbidirector-brings-silicon-valley-encryption-fight-to-capitol-hill [http://perma.cc/WH9Y-AW58].
78 See supra Section I.B.1.
79 NIST CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK, supra note 29, at 1.
80 Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, 78 Fed. Reg. 11,739, 11,741
(Feb. 12, 2013).
81 See, e.g., Tony Romm, Cybersecurity Still in Slow Lane, POLITICO (Feb. 9, 2014,
10:40 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/02/cybersecurity-in-slow-lane-one-yearafter-obama-order-103307.html?hp=f1 [http://perma.cc/8ZT4-K572] (“Nearly a year after
President Barack Obama issued an executive order to improve the cybersecurity of the
nation’s vital assets, the administration doesn’t have much to show: The government is
about to produce only some basic standards, with little incentive for the private sector to
participate.”); see also Mark Clayton, Why Obama’s Executive Order on Cybersecurity
Doesn’t Satisfy Most Experts, C HRISTIAN S CI. M ONITOR (Feb. 13, 2013),
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2013/0213/Why-Obama-s-executive-order-on-cyber
security-doesn-t-satisfy-most-experts [http://perma.cc/5TET-5DK6].
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voluntary it should be—questions that turn in part on the extent
to which a market failure is occurring in the global cybersecurity
arena.82 Yet, the NIST Framework is already having an impact,
both in the U.S. context, in terms of identifying and reinforcing
industry best practices, and beyond.83 Indeed, already some
private-sector clients are receiving the advice that if their
“cybersecurity practices were ever questioned during litigation or
a regulatory investigation, the ‘standard’ for ‘due diligence’ was
now the NIST Cybersecurity Framework.”84 This could arguably
be an instance, then, of cybersecurity regulation occurring from
the bottom-up, with this Framework helping to identify best
practices and punish market participants that fail to follow
them—which may help to better safeguard both intellectual
property and civil rights both in the United States and beyond as
part of a polycentric approach to fostering cyber peace.
IV. A POLYCENTRIC END GAME? ASSESSING THE
PROSPECTS FOR CYBER PEACE
No nation is an island in cyberspace, even if some may wish
they were.85 Thus, a multifaceted, multi-stakeholder approach to
global cybersecurity policymaking is required, which may be
considered a polycentric undertaking. This final part discusses
the literature on polycentric governance as a vehicle to promoting
cyber peace and, in so doing, helping safeguard both privacy and
intellectual property.
A.
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82 See, e.g., NIST’s Voluntary Cybersecurity Framework May Be Regarded as de
Facto Mandatory, supra note 8 (stating that experts have warned that many of the
recommendations in the framework “may be used by courts, regulators, and even
consumers to hold institutions accountable for failures that could have been prevented if
the cybersecurity framework had been fully implemented by the respective institution”).
83 See EU Eying NIST Framework with ‘Great Interest,’ INSIDE CYBERSECURITY,
http://insidecybersecurity.com/daily-news/official-eu-eying-nist-framework-great-interest
(last visited Mar. 26, 2016).
84 John Verry, Why the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Isn’t Really Voluntary,
PIVOTPOINT SECURITY (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.pivotpointsecurity.com/risky-business/
nist-cybersecurity-framework [http://perma.cc/48UL-8CHB].
85 See, e.g., 10 Most Censored Countries, COMMITTEE TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS,
https://cpj.org/2015/04/10-most-censored-countries.php [http://perma.cc/L6YN-D2LL].
86 Michael D. McGinnis, An Introduction to IAD and the Language of the Ostrom
Workshop, 39 POL’Y STUD. J. 163, 171–72 (2011), http://php.indiana.edu/~mcginnis/
iad_guide.pdf [http://perma.cc/769K-K32S] (defining polycentricity as “a system of
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Introducing Polycentric Governance
The field of polycentric governance has been built up over
some decades by the work of an array of eminent scholars led by
Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom and Professor Vincent Ostrom.
This multi-level, multi-purpose, multi-functional, and multi-sectoral
model86 that challenges orthodoxy by demonstrating the benefits
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of self-organization, networking regulations “at multiple
scales,”87 and examining the extent to which national and private
control can in some cases coexist with communal management,
as may be seen in the success of the Internet Engineering Task
Force (“IETF”).88 It also posits that, due to the existence of free
riders in a multipolar world, “a single governmental unit” is often
incapable of managing “global collective action problems,”89 such
as cyberattacks. Instead, a polycentric approach recognizes that
diverse organizations working at multiple governance scales from
companies to national governments to bilateral and regional
alliances can create policies that can increase levels of
cooperation and compliance, enhancing “flexibility across issues
and adaptability over time.”90
Although much of the fieldwork comprising polycentric
governance was conducted in the domestic context, such as
involving the governance of marine fisheries or commonly held
pastures, the notion has more recently been applied to a range of
global collective action problems, including climate change and
cyberattacks.91 The notion even seems to be diffusing beyond
academia. The likes of the President of Estonia, Toomas Ilves,
and the head of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names
and Numbers (“ICANN”), Fadi Chehadé, have used the term
“polycentric” to describe an end game for Internet governance.92
Such a model feeds off both public- and private-sector
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governance in which authorities from overlapping jurisdictions (or centers of authority)
interact to determine the conditions under which these authorities, as well as the citizens
subject to these jurisdictional units, are authorized to act as well as the constraints put
upon their activities for public purposes”).
87 Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems as One Approach for Solving Collective-Action
Problems 1 (Ind. Univ. Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Working Paper
Series No. 08–6, 2008), http://dlc.dlib.indiana.edu/dlc/bitstream/handle/10535/4417/W086_Ostrom_DLC.pdf?sequence=1 [http://perma.cc/BF4K-B534].
88 The IETF is responsible for managing the communications side of the Internet
through voluntary mechanisms for fostering multi-stakeholder collaboration. For more
background on IETF and the extent to which it may be considered a successful polycentric
undertaking, see Scott J. Shackelford & Amanda N. Craig, Beyond the New “Digital
Divide”: Analyzing the Evolving Role of Governments in Internet Governance and
Enhancing Cybersecurity, 50 STAN. J. INT’L L. 119 (2014).
89 Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change 35 (World
Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5095, 2009), http://www.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/
pe/2009/04268.pdf [http://perma.cc/N2BF-VSUE].
90 Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Climate Change, 9
PERSP. POL. 7, 9 (2011); cf. Julia Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and
Accountability in Polycentric Regulatory Regimes, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 137, 157 (2008)
(discussing the legitimacy of polycentric regimes, and arguing that “[a]ll regulatory
regimes are polycentric to varying degrees”).
91 See Ostrom, supra note 89; see also SHACKELFORD, supra note 9.
92 See Nancy Scola, ICANN Chief: “The Whole World is Watching” the U.S.’s Net
Neutrality Debate, WASH. POST (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/theswitch/wp/2014/10/07/internet-operations-chief-snowden-disclosures-make-my-job-easier/
[http://perma.cc/2BQB-H479].
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experimentation in which actors can learn about what works,
and does not work, in the field of cybersecurity management
without risking top-down governance structures crowding out
such bottom-up innovative efforts. According to Professor Ron
Diebert and Masashi Crete-Nishihata, “states learn from and
imitate” one another, and “[t]he most intense forms of imitation
and learning occur around national security issues because of the
high stakes and urgency involved.”93 Due to the common
perception on the part of many policymakers that cyber risk is
“escalating out of control,” an opportunity exists to engage in a
constructive, polycentric dialogue on norm building to promote
cyber peace.94
B.

Toward Cyber Peace
The International Telecommunication Union (“ITU”), a U.N.
agency specializing in information and communication
technologies, pioneered some of the early work in the field by
defining “cyber peace” in part as “a universal order of cyberspace”
built on a “wholesome state of tranquility, the absence of disorder
or disturbance and violence . . . .”95 Although certainly desirable,
such an outcome is politically and technically unlikely, at least in
the near term.96 That is why cyber peace is defined here not as
the absence of conflict, a state of affairs that may be called
negative cyber peace.97 Rather, it is the construction of a network
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93 Ronald J. Deibert & Masashi Crete-Nishihata, Global Governance and the Spread
of Cyberspace Controls, 18 GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 339, 350 (2012).
94 James Andrew Lewis, Confidence-Building and International Agreement in
Cybersecurity, in DISARMAMENT FORUM: CONFRONTING CYBERCONFLICT 51, 51–53
(Kerstin Vignard, Ross McRae & Jason Powers eds., 2011). Though norms do not bind
states like a treaty, Lewis notes that “[n]on-proliferation provides many examples of
non-binding norms that exercise a powerful influence on state behavior.” Id. at 53. This
position has also been supported by other scholars. See, e.g., Roger Hurwitz, An
Augmented Summary of the Harvard, MIT and U. of Toronto Cyber Norms Workshop 5
(2012), http://citizenlab.org/cybernorms/augmented-summary.pdf (“At the very least, acceptance
of a norm by a state puts the state’s reputation at risk. If it fails to follow the norm, other
states which accept that norm, will typically demand an explanation or account, rather
than ignoring the violation or dismissing it as self-interested behavior.”).
95 Henning Wegener, Cyber Peace, in THE QUEST FOR CYBER PEACE 77, 82 (Int’l
Telecomm. Union & Permanent Monitoring Panel on Info. Sec., 2011), http://www.itu.int/
dms_pub/itu-s/opb/gen/S-GEN-WFS.01-1-2011-PDF-E.pdf [http://perma.cc/Y2PC-FPGQ]. For
more on the topic of cyber peace generally, see SHACKELFORD, supra note 9.
96 To its credit, though, the ITU report recognizes this fact, and that the concept of
cyber peace should be broad and malleable given an ever-changing political climate and
cyber threat landscape. Henning Wegener, supra note 95, at 78 (“The definition [of cyber
peace] cannot be watertight, but must be rather intuitive, and incremental in its list of
ingredients.”).
97 The notion of negative peace has been applied in diverse contexts, including civil
rights. See, e.g., Martin Luther King, Non-violence and Racial Justice, CHRISTIAN
CENTURY, Feb. 6, 1957, at 118, 119 (“True peace is not merely the absence of some negative
force—tension, confusion or war; it is the presence of some positive force—justice, good
will and brotherhood.”).
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of multi-level regimes that promote global, just, and sustainable
cybersecurity by clarifying the rules of the road for companies
and countries alike to help reduce the threats of cyber conflict,
crime, and espionage to levels comparable to other business and
national security risks. To achieve this goal, a new approach to
cybersecurity is needed that seeks out best practices from the
public and private sectors to enhance cybersecurity due diligence.
Working together through polycentric partnerships, we can
mitigate the risk of cyberwar by laying the groundwork for a
positive cyber peace that respects human rights including
privacy, spreads Internet access along with best practices to help
safeguard valuable intellectual property, and strengthens
governance mechanisms by fostering multi-stakeholder
collaboration.98
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98 See Johan Galtung, Peace, Positive and Negative, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PEACE
PSYCHOLOGY 760, 760–62 (Daniel J. Christie ed., 2011) (comparing the concepts of
negative and positive peace). Definitions of positive peace vary depending on context, but
the overarching issue in the cybersecurity space is the need to address structural
problems in all forms, including the root causes of cyber insecurity, such as economic and
political inequities and legal ambiguities, as well as working to build a culture of peace.
Id. “The goal is to build a structure based on reciprocity, equal rights, benefits, and
dignity . . . and a culture of peace, confirming and stimulating an equitable economy and
an equal polity.” Id. at 761; see also A Declaration on A Culture of Peace, UNESCO,
A/Res/53/243, www.unesco.org/cpp/uk/declarations/2000.htm [http://perma.cc/22DW-GBQX]
(offering a discussion of the prerequisites for creating a culture of peace including
education, multi-stakeholder collaboration, and the “promotion of the rights of everyone to
freedom of expression, opinion and information”).
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CONCLUSION
This Article has assessed the extent to which national
cybersecurity strategies are addressing the economic impact of
cyberthreats as part of a larger discussion on the appropriate role
for the State in regulating cybersecurity, particularly in the
fields of protecting intellectual property and civil rights and
liberties. Overall, we have found that, although more nations are
publishing national cybersecurity strategies that discuss common
concerns such as cybercrime, only a minority discuss the
importance of protecting intellectual property generally, and far
fewer trade secrets in particular. Likewise, though privacy is
discussed by a supermajority of nations in their cybersecurity
strategies, fewer discuss civil rights, and even less engage with
civil liberties protections. Consequently, it may prove fruitful to
look beyond national cybersecurity policymaking if progress is to
be made toward enhancing global cybersecurity such as by
engaging with the private-sector to help instill an array of
proactive best practices, such as that which may now be
occurring under the guise of the NIST Framework, which
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includes a set of privacy best practices.99 Over time, the success
of this Framework and others could help promote legal
harmonization and pave the way for norm convergence, or even a
norm cascade, including in the fields of trade secrets theft and
privacy.100 But the road will be long, even as the destination may
now be coming into sharper relief. Ultimately, we all have a role
in safeguarding both privacy and intellectual property in the
digital age as part of a polycentric, all-of-the-above approach to
fostering cyber peace in an age of seemingly endless cyber
insecurity.
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See NIST CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK, supra note 29, at 15–16.
See Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and
Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 895–98 (1998).
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Appendix A: Non-comprehensive Review of
Economic Espionage and Intellectual Property
Protection from G34 Nations
Country
Name

Year

Armenia

2005

Title of
Cybersecurity
Strategy
Armenia National
Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace

Quoted Language &
Provisions101
Armenia’s enemies may conduct
espionage on our Government,
university research centers, and
private companies. They may also
seek to prepare for cyber strikes
during a confrontation by mapping
Armenia information systems,
identifying key targets, and lacing
our infrastructure with back doors
and other means of access. In
wartime or crisis, adversaries may
seek to intimidate the country’s
political leaders by attacking
critical infrastructures and key
economic functions or eroding
public confidence in information
systems. (P.3)

Australia

2009

Australian
Government Cyber
Security Strategy

The Statement indicates electronic
espionage, both commercial and
state-based, will be a growing
vulnerability as the Australian
Government and society become
more dependent on integrated
information technologies. It states
that this challenge must and will
be met with full vigour and
identifies cyber security as amongst
the Australian Government’s top
tier national security priorities.
(P.4)

101

05/09/2016 12:16:02

The Australian Security
Intelligence Organisation’s (ASIO)
responsibilities are defined by the
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Cyber attacks on Armenia
information networks can have
serious consequences such as
disrupting critical operations,
causing loss of revenue and
intellectual property, or loss of life.
Countering such attacks requires
the development of robust
capabilities where they do not exist
today if we are to reduce
vulnerabilities and deter those with
the capabilities and intent to harm
our critical infrastructures. (P.3)

All material is quoted directly from the listed cybersecurity strategy.
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Australian Security Intelligence
Organisation Act 1979 and, in
relation to cyber security, include:
• Investigating electronic attacks
conducted for purpose of espionage,
sabotage, terrorism or other forms
of politically motivated violence,
attacks on the defence system and
other matters that fall under the
heads of security in the ASIO Act
(P.29)
Australia is vulnerable to the loss
of economic competitiveness
through the continued exploitation
of ICT networks and the
compromise of intellectual property
and other sensitive commercial
data. This has the potential to
undermine Australians’ confidence
in the digital economy. (P.4)
2013

Austrian Cyber
Security Strategy

The term “cyber attack” refers to an
attack through IT in cyber space,
which is directed against one or
several IT system(s). Its aim is to
undermine the objectives of ICT
security protection (confidentiality,
integrity and availability) partly or
totally. Cyber attacks directed
against the confidentiality of an IT
system are referred to as “cyber
espionage,” i.e. digital spying.
Cyber attacks directed against the
integrity and availability of an IT
system are referred to as cyber
sabotage. (P.20)

Belgium

2014

Cyber Security
Strategy

The text is only available in French
and Dutch.

Canada

2010

Cyber Security
Strategy

Canadian organizations had
suffered a cyber attack. The loss of
intellectual property as a result of
these attacks doubled between
2006 and 2008. (P.4)
The most sophisticated cyber
threats come from the intelligence
and military services of foreign
states. In most cases, these
attackers are well resourced,
patient and persistent. Their
purpose is to gain political,
economic, commercial or military
advantage. (P.5)
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2011

Cybersecurity
Strategy of the
Czech Republic

N/A
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37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 64 Side A

Austria

37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 64 Side B

05/09/2016 12:16:02

Do Not Delete

4/23/16 9:50 AM

468

Chapman Law Review

Denmark

2012

Estonia

2008

Finland

2013

France

2011

Germany

2011

[Vol. 19:2

Danish Defense
Agreement 2013–17
Cyber Security
Strategy

N/A

Cyber Security
Strategy
Information
Systems Defense
and Security

N/A

Cybersecurity
Strategy

The interests of the private sector
to protect itself against crime and
espionage in cyberspace should also
be adequately taken into account.
(P.5)

Other forms of cyber crime include
harassment, fraud, the distribution
of illegal materials or the violation
of intellectual property rights.
(P.11)

Cyberspace, like a virtual
battleground, has become a place
for confrontation: appropriation of
personal data, espionage of the
scientific, economic and commercial
assets of companies which fall
victim to competitors or foreign
powers, disruption of services
necessary for the proper
functioning of the economy and
daily life, compromise of
information related to our
sovereignty and even, in certain
circumstances, loss of human lives
are nowadays the potential or
actual consequences of the overlap
between the digital world and
human activity. (P.3)
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A cyber attack is an IT attack in
cyberspace directed against one or
several other IT systems and aimed
at damaging IT security. The aims
of IT security, confidentiality,
integrity and availability may all or
individually be compromised. Cyber
attacks directed against the
confidentiality of an IT system,
which are launched or managed by
foreign intelligence services, are
called cyber espionage. Cyber
attacks against the integrity and
availability of IT systems are
termed cyber sabotage. (P.9)
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The capabilities of law enforcement
agencies, the Federal Office for
Information Security and the
private sector in combating cyber
crime, also with regard to
protection against espionage and
sabotage, must be strengthened.
(P.6)
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Hungary

2013

India

2013

Italy

2013

National Cyber
Security Strategy
National Cyber
Security Strategy
National Strategic
Framework for
Cyberspace
Security

469

N/A
N/A
Cybercrime is a plague that can
cause the bankruptcy of firms and
the theft of their intellectual
property, crippling the wealth of an
entire nation. (P.5)
Cybercrime: all malicious activities
with a criminal intent carried out
in cyberspace, such as swindles or
internet fraud, identify theft,
stealing of data or of intellectual
property. (P.13)

Japan

2013

Cybersecurity
Strategy: Toward a
World-Leading,
Resilient and
Vigorous
Cyberspace

In the EU, in addition to natural
disasters, terrorism and other
situations, new transnational
threats of economic espionage or
state-sponsored cyber attacks have
led to an awareness of the growing
frequency and scale of cybersecurity
incidents . . . (P.16–17)
Private companies, educational
institutions and research
institutions possess intellectual
property related information such
as technological information,
financial information,
manufacturing technology
information and drawings, as well
as personal information such as
client lists, personnel information
and educational information, and
other critical information. (P.25)

2010

2014
Lithuania

2011

Luxembourg

2011

Malaysia

2006

Law on the Security
of Information
Technologies
Cyber Security
Strategy of Latvia
Programme for the
Development of
Electronic
Information
Security (Cyber
Security) for 2011–
2019
National Strategy
on Cyber Security
National Cyber
Security Policy

N/A

N/A
N/A

Extensive coverage from pages 4–10.

Formalise the coordination and
prioritization of cyber security
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Development Towards SelfReliance
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research and development activities
Enlarge and strengthen the cyber
security research community
Promote the development and
commercialization of intellectual
properties, technologies and
innovations through focused
research and development
Nurture the growth of cyber
security industry (P.5)
Netherlands

2011

The National Cyber
Security Strategy

The threats from other states
mostly concern the theft of
confidential or competition
sensitive information (cyber
espionage), while professional
criminals mainly focus on digital
fraud and theft of information. (P.7)
More active approach to cyber
espionage

Furthermore, the government will
prioritize a better protection of data
citizens share with the government
and being more transparent about
data management. (P.24)
New Zealand

2011

Cyber Security
Strategy

05/09/2016 12:16:02

Criminals are increasingly using
cyber space to gain access to
personal information, steal
businesses’ intellectual property,
and gain knowledge of sensitive
government-held information for
financial or political gain or other
malicious purposes. (P.1)
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The Dutch government is
committed to raising awareness
among citizens, businesses,
organization and government
bodies about information security
and privacy. This means that
awareness campaigns will partly
focus on increasing knowledge and
insight into the risks of cyber
espionage. On the other hand, the
government also ensures that the
issue is prioritized within the
intelligence and security services,
which are given the tools to better
document cyber threats and
investigate and combat advanced
attacks. To this end, the
intelligence and security services
have combined their cyber
capabilities in the Joint Sigint
Cyber Unit (JSCU).
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Some of the most advanced and
persistent cyber attacks on
governments and critical
infrastructure worldwide are
thought to originate from foreign
military and intelligence services or
organised criminal groups. Media
organisations around the world are
reporting attacks on government
systems, national infrastructure
and businesses that have resulted
in access to commercially sensitive
information, intellectual property
and state or trade secrets. (P.5)
2012

National Strategy
for Information
Security

The trend toward targeted and
professional hacking of critical ICT
systems is increasing. Targeted
espionage attacks against vital
national security interests now
constitute a significant challenge.
Civil services, military units and
private companies are all
vulnerable to espionage and
sabotage. Many countries are
developing capabilies for espionage
and warfare against critical
infrastructure. We must assume
that sophisticated sabotage and
attacks will be directed against
critical information resources,
including the computer systems
that control industrial processes
and critical infrastructure. (P.12)

Poland

2013

N/A

Qatar

2011

Cyberspace
Protection Policy
National ICT Plan
2015: Advancing
the Digital Agenda

Republic of
Korea
Romania

2010

N/A

Russia

2000

2010 Defense White
Paper
Cyber Security
Strategy and the
National Action
Plan on
Implementation of
the National Cyber
Security
National Security
Concept of the
Russian Federation

N/A

[R]einforcing the mechanisms of
legal governance of relations in the
field of intellectual property
protection, and creating conditions
for observance of the federally
prescribed restrictions on access to
confidential information.
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2013

Protecting the intellectual property
rights of digital content creators.
(P.19)
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Saudi Arabia

2013

Singapore

2013

Slovak
Republic

2008

South Africa

2010

Spain

2013

Developing
National
Information
Security Strategy
for the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia
National Cyber
Security
Masterplan 2018
National Strategy
for Information
Security
Cyber Security
Policy
National Cyber
Security: A
Commitment for
Everybody

[Vol. 19:2

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A
The threats against information are
those that cause the loss, misshandling, disclosure or misuse of
information.
Among these threats are:
• Espionage. Within this category
all varieties of espionage are
included, from state espionage to
industrial espionage. (P.17)

2013

The National
Security Strategy:
Sharing a Common
Project

Economic espionage is of great
importance in today’s competitive
environment and consists of the
illegal procurement of information,
industrial property or critical
technology, and even involves
attempts to exert illegal influence
on political decisions of an economic
nature. Its potential impact is
increasing on account of its ability
to harm the economic system and
affect citizens’ well-being.
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Spain, like the rest of the EU and
NATO members, faces hostile
actions from other States. These
actions are always contrary to
national interests – regardless of
whether they originate from within
or outside Spanish territory – and

37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 66 Side B

Espionage has adapted to the new
landscape of the globalised world
and currently makes use of the
possibilities
provided
by
information and communication
technologies. Aggressions by States,
groups or individuals for the
purpose of gaining information that
gives them strategic, political or
economic advantages have been a
constant feature in history and
continue to pose a major threat to
security.
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are particularly aggressive in
situations of conflict or tension.
Together with traditional espionage
methods, these activities are
increasingly based on sophisticated
technological training programmes
that can provide access to huge
amounts of information and, in a
worst-case scenario, to sensitive
data. (P.33)
Sweden

2010

Switzerland

2012

Turkey

2013

United
Kingdom

2011

Strategy for
Information
Security in Sweden
2010 – 2015
National Strategy
for Switzerland’s
Protection Against
Cyber Risks

N/A

National Cyber
Security Strategy
and 2013-2014
Action Plan
Cyber Security
Strategy

N/A

The private sector is thus very
vulnerable to cyber risks, e.g.
attacks to deceive, to obtain unjust
financial gain or for economic
espionage. Therefore, the inclusion
of all stakeholders (e.g. private
sector, in particular CI operators,
ICT service or system providers) in
the strategy is essential in order to
protect against cyber risks. (P.6)

Organisations are not always
aware of the new vulnerabilities
that dependence on cyberspace can
bring. Intellectual property and
other commercially sensitive
information (for example, business
strategies) can be attractive
targets. (P.16)

Business is the largest victim of
crime and economic espionage
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The Centre for the Protection of
National Infrastructure delivers
advice that aims to reduce the
vulnerability of organisations in the
national infrastructure to terrorism
and other threats such as
espionage, including those from
cyberspace. (P.28)
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Some of the most sophisticated
threats to the UK in cyberspace
come from other states which seek
to conduct espionage with the aim
of spying on or compromising our
government, military, industrial
and economic assets, as well as
monitoring opponents of their own
regimes. (P.15)
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perpetrated through cyberspace.
(P.32)
United States

2008

Comprehensive
National
Cybersecurity
Initiative

N/A

2011

Department of
Defense Strategy
for Operating in
Cyberspace

Whether malicious insiders are
committing espionage, making a
political statement, or expressing
personal disgruntlement, the
consequences for DoD, and national
security, can be devastating. (P.3)
While the threat to intellectual
property is often less visible than
the threat to critical infrastructure,
it may be the most pervasive cyber
threat today. Every year, an
amount of intellectual property
larger than that contained in the
Library of Congress is stolen from
networks maintained by U.S.
businesses, universities, and
government departments and
agencies. As military strength
ultimately depends on economic
vitality, sustained intellectual
property losses erode both U.S.
military effectiveness and national
competitiveness in the global
economy. (P.4)
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Appendix B: Non-comprehensive Review of Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties from G34 Nations
Country
Name

Year

Armenia

2005

Australia

2009

Title of
Cybersecurity
Strategy
Armenia National
Strategy to Secure
Cyberspace

Australian
Government Cyber
Security Strategy

Quoted Provisions
Privacy and civil liberties must be
protected in the process. Because
no cybersecurity plan can be
unreceptive to sophisticated and
intelligent attack, information
systems must be able to operate
while under attack and have the
resilience to restore full operations
quickly. (P.4)
Australia must pursue cyber
security policies that enhance
individual and collective security
while preserving Australians’ right
to privacy and other fundamental
values and freedoms. Maintaining
this balance is a continuing
challenge for all modern
democracies seeking to meet the
complex cyber security challenges
of the future. (P.vi)
Confronting and managing these
risks must be balanced against the
civil liberties of Australians,
including the right to privacy, and
the need to promote efficiency and
innovation to ensure that Australia
realises the full potential of the
digital economy. (P.4)

Austrian Cyber
Security Strategy

Governance in the area of cyber
security has to meet the high
standards of the rule of law of the
Austrian administration and
guarantee compliance with human
rights, in particular privacy and
data protection as well as the
freedom of expression and the right
to information. (P.7)

Belgium

2014

Cyber Security
Strategy

The text is only available in French
and Dutch.

Canada

2010

Cyber Security
Strategy

The Government is taking steps to
protect cyberspace from becoming a
criminal haven. We will deny cyber
criminals the anonymity they are
seeking while at the same time
protecting the privacy of Canadians.
(P.12)
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Czech
Republic

2011

Cybersecurity
Strategy of the
Czech Republic

There is no way how to achieve
absolute cybernetic security. The
Czech Republic will adopt measures
based on realistic evaluation of
risks and shall be appropriate to
such risks. They will respect
protection of privacy and basic
rights as free access to information,
freedom of speech and others. The
measures shall be appropriate to
the necessity to ensure security on
one side and to respect basic rights
and freedoms on the other side.
(P.5)

Denmark

2012

N/A

Estonia

2008

Danish Defense
Agreement 2013–17
Cyber Security
Strategy

The procurement of national cyber
security should be based on the
following principles and guidelines:
• cyber security action plans should
be integrated into the routine
processes of national security
planning;
• cyber security should be pursued
through the co-ordinated efforts of
all concerned stakeholders, of
public and private sectors as well
as of civil society; (P.7)

Finland

2013

Cyber Security
Strategy
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Protection of privacy means the
protection against the unlawful or
hurtful invasion of personal privacy.
Protection of privacy includes the
right to privacy and other associated
rights in the processing of personal
data. Personal data means any
information on a private individual
and any information on his/her
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In the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development
(OECD), the issue of cyber security
is the responsibility of the
Committee for Information, the
Computer and Communications
Policy and its working groups,
including the Working Party on
Information Security and Privacy.
The Committee has adopted several
recommendations, including the
Recommendation Concerning
Guidelines for the Security of
Information Systems and Networks
(2002) and the Recommendation on
Cross-border Co-operation in the
Enforcement of Laws Protecting
Privacy (2007). (P.25)

37838-chp_19-2 Sheet No. 69 Side A

05/09/2016 12:16:02

Do Not Delete

5/3/2016 3:55 PM

2016] Protecting Intellectual Property & Privacy in the Digital Age

477

personal characteristics or personal
circumstances, where these are
identifiable as concerning him/her or
the members of his/her family or
household. (P.13)
2011

Information
Systems Defense
and Security
Cybersecurity
Strategy
National Cyber
Security Strategy
National Cyber
Security Strategy
National Strategic
Framework for the
Security of
Cyberspace

N/A

Germany

2011

Hungary

2013

India

2013

Italy

2013

Japan

2013

Cybersecurity
Strategy: Toward a
World-Leading,
Resilient and
Vigorous
Cyberspace

As a result, cyberspace has
provided us a variety of positive
benefits including innovation,
economic growth, and solutions for
social issues while still ensuring
freedom of expression and
protection of privacy. (P.20)

Latvia

2010

Law on the Security
of Information
Technologies
Cyber Security
Strategy of Latvia
Programme for the
Development of
Electronic
Information
Security (Cyber
Security) for 2011–
2019

N/A

2014
Lithuania

N/A
N/A
Balancing these often diverging
objectives is a complex endeavor, if
one considers for instance how
monitoring the technical
functionality of networks is essential
to allow the fulfillment of the right
to privacy and the integrity of one’s
communication appliances, or also
how it can be difficult to find the
right balance between the right to
privacy and the fight against
criminal activities such as child
pornography, drugs smuggling, hate
incitement, or terrorism planning crimes that not only hurt individual
and social liberties, but also
undermine the very existence of an
open, democratic and free Internet.
(P.11–12).

N/A
The purpose of the Programme is to
determine the objectives and tasks
for the development of electronic
information in order to ensure the
confidentiality, integrity and
accessibility of electronic
information and services provided
in cyberspace, safeguarding of
electronic communication networks,
information systems and critical
information infrastructure against
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N/A
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incidents and cyber attacks,
protection of personal data and
privacy, as well as to set the tasks,
implementation of which would
allow total security of cyberspace
and entities operating in this
medium. (P.1)
Luxembourg

2011

Macedonia

2012

Malaysia

2006

Netherlands

2011

National Strategy
on Cyber Security
Strategy for
Personal Data
Protection in
Republic of
Macedonia 2012–
2016

N/A

National Cyber
Security Policy
The National Cyber
Security Strategy

N/A

Everyone has right to privacy. I
own my privacy, is the motto of the
Directorate for Personal Data
Protection. Personal data
protection is part of our everyday
life and base for functioning of the
modern and democratic society
grounded on the constitutional
guarantees for respecting the
fundamental human rights.
Guarantying privacy means
establishing system for technical
and organizational measures by the
controllers and processors of
personal data, as well as high
public awareness in the society as a
unavoidable condition for reaction
in case of breach of the right of
privacy and evaluation of the
achieved results. (P.4)

The Internet of Things (everything
is connected to the internet) and
hyperconnectivity (everything is
connected to each other) promotes
innovation and results in usability.
At the same time, it raises the
question of whether or not digitally
linked products and services are
actually safe and what the
implications may be for privacy.
(P.15)
New Zealand

2011

Nigeria

2011

Cyber Security
Strategy
Cybersecurity Bill,
2011

N/A

05/09/2016 12:16:02

Anyone exercising any function
under this section shall have due
regard to the individual right to
privacy under the Constitution of
the Federal Republic of Nigeria,
1999 and shall take appropriate
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Together with private sector
partners, the government works to
develop standards that can be used
to protect and improve the security
of ICT products and services. (P.10)
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measures to safeguard the
confidentiality of the data retained,
processed or retrieved for the
purpose of law enforcement. (P.8)
Norway

2012

National Strategy
for Information
Security

Personal privacy is also threatened
by new methods of communication
and ways to use information
systems and the Internet. Identity
abuse is a growing challenge for
individuals, businesses and public
authorities. (P.14)

Poland

2013

N/A

Qatar

2011

Cyberspace
Protection Policy
National ICT Plan
2015: Advancing
the Digital Agenda

Republic of
Korea
Romania

2010

N/A

Russia

2000

2010 Defense White
Paper
Cyber Security
Strategy and the
National Action
Plan on
Implementation of
the National Cyber
Security
National Security
Concept of the
Russian Federation

Saudi Arabia

2013

N/A

Singapore

2013

Developing
National
Information
Security Strategy
for the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia
National Cyber
Security
Masterplan 2018

N/A

[S]ecuring the constitutional rights
and freedoms of man and the
citizen to personal and family
privacy, the secrecy of postal mail,
telegraph, telephone and other
communications, as well as to the
defense of honor and reputation.

05/09/2016 12:16:02
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2013

ictQATAR is working with
stakeholders to develop a legal
framework to protect the privacy of
personal information, which is
critical to the healthy development
of Qatar’s ICT sector. This
framework, targeted for completion
by the end ot [sic] 2011, will set the
minimum level of privacy
protection required for all sectors,
including finance, education,
health, and law enforcement. The
framework will draw upon
international best practices, while
being innovative, forward looking,
and technology neutral in its
approach. (P.22)
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Slovak
Republic

2008

National Strategy
for Information
Security

The approach to addressing
security is driven by the need to
resolve a problem which originated
from scientific and technological
development and has by now fully
translated into a global social issue.
Society seeks to resolve this
problem and ensure both the
protection of its valuable assets and
individuals’ privacy. (P.4)

South Africa

2010

N/A

Spain

2013

Cyber Security
Policy
National Cyber
Security, a
Commitment for
Everybody

Sweden

2010

N/A

Switzerland

2012

Strategy for
Information
Security in Sweden
2010 – 2015
National Strategy
for Switzerland’s
Protection Against
Cyber Risks

Turkey

2013

National Cyber
Security Strategy
and 2013-2014
Action Plan

The principles of rule of law,
fundamental human rights and
freedoms and protection of privacy
should be accepted as essential
principles. (P.16)

United
Kingdom

2011

Cyber Security
Strategy

We are determined to tackle the
threats, but in a way which
balances security with respect for
privacy and fundamental rights. At
home and internationally the UK
Government will continue to work
to ensure that cyberspace remains
an open space – open to innovation
and the free flow of ideas,
information and expression. (P.5)

Spanish society must become aware
of individual risks (privacy and
intimacy) and collective risks
(national security, economic, social
and cultural prosperity) to which it
would be exposed in the event of an
irresponsible use of cyber space.
The Government of Spain must
lead an educational model and
promote cyber security. (P.38)
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Actions to strengthen our national
security must also be consistent
with our obligations, such as those
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A second sphere where interests
might conflict are personal rights:
Efforts to improve protective
mechanisms in cyberspace (e.g.
through stricter controls or
surveillance), must be weighed
against the protection of privacy. It
is one of the tasks of this strategy,
to take such considerations into
account and to show how measures
can be taken circumspectively. (P.7)
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concerning freedom of expression;
the right to seek, receive and
impart ideas; and the right to
privacy. Defending security should
be consistent with our commitment
to uphold civil liberties. Of course,
these are well-established and
ongoing debates, but cyberspace
can bring them into focus in new
ways, and more quickly than in
other areas. (P.17)
At home we will pursue cyber
security policies that enhance
individual and collective security
while preserving UK citizens’ right
to privacy and other fundamental
values and freedoms. (P.22)
United States

2008

Comprehensive
National
Cybersecurity
Initiative

Finally, the President directed that
these activities be conducted in a
way that is consistent with
ensuring the privacy rights and
civil liberties guaranteed in the
Constitution and cherished by all
Americans. (P.1)
The CNCI was developed with
great care and attention to privacy
and civil liberties concerns in close
consultation with privacy experts
across the government. Protecting
civil liberties and privacy rights
remain fundamental objectives in
the implementation of the CNCI.
(P.2)

2011

DoD, working with its interagency
and international partners, seeks to
mitigate the risks posed to U.S. and
allied cyberspace capabilities, while
protecting and respecting the
principles of privacy and civil
liberties, free expression, and
innovation that have made
cyberspace an integral part of U.S.
prosperity and security. (P.1)
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